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Introduction

“As long as disability is addressed in terms of the themes of sin-disability
conflation, virtuous suffering, or charitable action, it will be seen primarily as a
fate to be avoided… rather than an ordinary life to be lived.”1
The above quote from Disability Theologian Nancy Eiesland is exemplary
of a theme that runs through the literature of Disability Theology: that people
with disabilities are often treated as heroes, survivors, symbols of virtuous
suffering, objects of repulsion, and/or any number of other caricatures, especially
within the church. I use the term “caricatures” because a common experience for
people with disabilities is to find a few of their attributes are exaggerated, in the
eyes of others, and the rest of their identity is lost to these exaggerated features.
This experience leaves a lopsided and ultimately diminished view of the person;
in short, a caricature. While people with disabilities may indeed be heroic, may
be suffering, or may find themselves the object of others’ repulsion, the person
and their identity is almost always lost in whatever ill formed idea the person is
presumed to symbolize. Furthermore, people with disabilities who are treated as
such symbols may not identify themselves under these categories at all and such
inappropriate symbolizations do an inherent violence to their identity by
imposing a role which the individual may not, and in many cases absolutely
wont, want to assume.
Nancy Eiesland, The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1994), 75.
1
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In this thesis, I draw on the work of Disability Theologians, Disability
Scholars, and the Christological notion of the communicatio idiomatum to suggest
that those of us in the church ought to transform our conceptualization of people
with disabilities. This transformation should take us from thinking of people
with disabilities as dependent, unfortunate, and deserving of our pity to
conceiving of them as autonomous2, made in the Imago Dei, and deserving of our
respect. The initial sections give a detailed presentation of the varying views of
disability, followed by a very particular view of Christology. I will then move
into some of the practices that have been suggested for the church in its
interactions with people with disabilities and on their behalf. The ultimate goal is
that readers transform their approach to people with disabilities both
conceptually and practically. This transformation should lead us to interact with
individuals with disabilities in ways that allow these people to define and
express their own identities and limitations, in their own time, with their own
language. Likewise, I hope that those who interact with these same people might
have some grasp on how they can cease to impose their own ideas about
disabled identities and limits onto people with disabilities.

2 I do not mean to suggest that all people with disabilities can live alone or care for
themselves independently. This is not the case. Rather, the non-disabled owe people with disabilities
the basic respect of assuming 1) they are capable of some independent decision making and 2) they
have some level of self-awareness.
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An important, guiding question for our consideration is: how might
people with disabilities be conceived of differently in light of how we conceive of
the nature of our savior, the particularities of his incarnation, death and
resurrection, and the limits that all people posses? I suspect that some of the
ideas presented here will be applicable and practical for people outside the
church as well, especially for any person who sees an intrinsic value in human
life and the diversity of human expression.

Terms for Disability
I should state from the start that I am disabled. Though the particular
defect that causes me to be disabled is congenital, and as such has been with me
for my whole life, it was not until late in my undergraduate years that I ever
considered identifying myself as a person with a disability. I had always
considered having Brachydactyly (the genetic disorder I possess that causes my
fingers and toes to be significantly shorter than average) to be merely a fact of
my life, not a qualifier for inclusion in any specific group. It was part of my
identity the same way that being the youngest child was: only incidentally.
Though I have always been keenly aware of the limitations inherent in my
condition, I had never thought of myself primarily as a person who was any “less
able” than most people in most regards, though I certainly possess limitations
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that the average person does not. As an example, I cannot easily hold most
beverage cans so I crush them part way to make them easier to hang onto, the
chords on the banjo are not easily formed for me so I use an alternate tuning, and
when change falls to the back of the coin return on a vending machine I know
that I will not be the one retrieving my coinage. Yet despite these limitations, for
a long time I primarily thought of myself as having an atypical body, not a
disability. I realize now that at that time I was conflating disability with less
ability, a problematic perspective that I was not alone in holding.
Though I often prefer to think of myself as having an atypical body, rather
than being disabled, throughout the course of this thesis I primarily use the
terms “people with disabilities”3 and “people with nonconventional bodies,”4
(the latter being a category I have always been much more comfortable putting
myself in) to talk about those whom most would call “the disabled” or “disabled
people.” The first term is the one that seems to be most widely used in both
disability theology and disability studies. While its phrasing may seem
cumbersome to many, the point of the term is to emphasize that the people about

3 Elziabeth DePoy and Stephen French Gilson present a convincing argument against the use
of this term based in the fact that disability is generally considered to be socially constructed, but do
not present a suitable alternative. Elizabeth DePoy and Stephen French Gilson, Studying Disability:
Multiple Theories and Responses (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2011), 39.
4 In this paper, I have attempted to think holistically about the body and include the brain
and its various functions as part of the body. As such, my intention is that the use of the term
“nonconventional bodies” does not exclude those with emotional or cognitive disabilities. As well I
will use terms like body, corporeality and the like with the whole person being the intended subject.
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whom we are speaking are, first and foremost, people, which is crucial to our
understanding of identity. However, many people, the author included, who are
often lumped into the category of “people with disabilities” do not wish to have
themselves thought of in terms that focus on a disability/ability binary. This is
also why I personally find the term “differently abled” quite off-putting. While it
breaks the binary, the term still focuses its categorization on arbitrary measures
of capacity or “ability;” different, dis-, or otherwise, it should not be the focus of
our categories. Rather than placing themselves somewhere on an ability scale,
some people with disabilities prefer to think of their bodies as nonconventional
or atypical. Given that “nonconventional bodies” is more widely used than
“atypical bodies” in the literature, I will continue with that trend here.
A final, important point to be made about how one talks about people
with disabilities is in the distinction between an impairment, a handicap, and a
disability. While these words may seem to convey the same notion, their
meanings are different, different enough that a brief overview is worthwhile for
the sake of understanding what follows. First, an impairment lies within the
individual. This is typically a feature that is abnormal or a function of some sort
that is lost to this person. Missing arms, an under-functioning portion of the
brain, or short fingers would would fit this category. A disability is what follows
from the impairment and is based on the interaction between the person and the
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person’s physical world. A person may not be able to safely drive a car with
certain types of brain damage, or be able to easily grip some cups with small
fingers and this would constitute a disability. Finally, a handicap follows from
the disability as an expectation that society imposes upon individuals, which the
individual cannot live up to. The person with brain damage may want to live in a
very rural area but without the ability to drive, the person must rely on public
transportation or the good will of their neighbors, both of which may be severely
lacking. Take note here that the sources of the limitations described include the
individual’s body, the incidental nature of the world around them, and/or
broader human society and its intentional and unintentional constructs. This will
be part and parcel of what drives the discussion of how we understand
disability.5

Historic Understandings of Disability
While we are here thinking of disability as a social force, as per the
previous definitions, disability has been conceptualized in a myriad of ways
throughout history. Even in the few centuries since the colonization of America,

5 Nancy Eiesland and Deborah Beth Creamer both break these concepts down in helpful
ways and I have largely drawn on the two of them for my understandings of these terms. Eiesland,
Disabled God, 27; Deborah Beth Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and
Constructive Possibilities (New York: Oxford University Press 2009), 13-14.
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Americans have thought of “disability”6 in drastically different terms in different
centuries. Consider that before European settlers arrived, Indigenous American
people thought of “disability” primarily in terms of a disharmony between mind,
body, and spirit.7 This is a conceptualization that I find quite appealing and that I
imagine many theologians could make good use of. Disability historian Kim
Nielsen explains that for Indigenous Americans, because many of their
“worldviews rested on the core belief that all had gifts, aging and the bodily
changes that accompanied it did not lead to an assumption of diminished
capacity.”8 In essence, for Indigenous Americans, the body had not been so
idealized that variations were viewed negatively.
Around the time many of the New England colonies were being
established, most of the European settlers thought of “disability” as the lack of
capacity to do meaningful work.9 As such, some people with readily apparent
mental impediments were still entrusted to be teachers or given other significant
working opportunities, keeping them from the category of “disabled” (i.e. unable

I use quotation marks here largely because of Nielsen’s point that “disability” was not the
primary word used to talk about what we now consider disability for much of America’s history. Kim
E. Nielsen, A Disability History of the United States (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012), xx.
6

7

Ibid, 5.

8

Ibid, 9.

9

Ibid, 26-27.
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to work) even though they had a mental impairment.10 This same attitude
continued through the antebellum period11 and well into the early twentieth
century as well. After the Civil War, and again after the First World War,
disability became valorized for some individuals as society upheld disabled,
male, mostly white, veterans for their service and conceived of their impairments
and handicaps as the byproduct of meaningful sacrifices made for the nation.12
Closely related to this mindset, shortly after the end of the First World War
distinctions began to be made separating the “successful” from the “begging
type” of cripples, the supposedly “successful” being those who could
independently make a living.13 In the early twentieth century the eugenics
movement had a prominent and problematic combination with societal
assumptions about the handicaps of people with disabilities. The result was that
by the early 1960’s, about 65,000 people with disabilities had been legally
sterilized in forced sterilizations.14 Around this time disability activists were
beginning to coalesce more and more with the disability equivalent of the Civil
Rights Act finally being passed in 1990 in the form of the Americans with

10

Ibid, 34.

11

Ibid, 74-75.

12

Ibid, 87, 127.

13

Ibid, 128.

14

Ibid, 100.
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Disabilities Act, more commonly known as the ADA. This created a myriad of
protections and aids for people with disabilities. Unfortunately, many religious
institutions also sought to exempt themselves from these rules.
These varied conceptualizations of disability across just a few centuries, in
one country, certainly leads to more questions. When did we begin to idealize
the body and the mind such that we no longer trusted people with disabilities to
work? When did we decide that we needed to lock some people away in
institutions? Further research into the history of disability could certainly yield
interesting answers to these questions, but the transformation of the American
conceptualization of disability from simple notions of psycho-spiritual-physical
disharmony to “unsuccessful cripple” represents an unhealthy change. A change
that distances the person with a disability from the physically or cognitively
“typical” person. Some of our contemporary models open this gap further, while
others attempt to close it.

Modern Models of Disability
Today, disability is still defined in a variety of ways and it would be hard
to argue that any one model for conceptualization is “right” as each one has its
own benefits and shortcomings. That said, there are certainly preferences
amongst scholars and people with disabilities.
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The Medical Model
Up until the mid 1990’s and the passing of the ADA, what is commonly
known as the Medical Model of disability was the preeminent model for
understanding disability. Essentially, this model assumes that most people have
“normal” bodies that function “normally” but some people have diagnosable
variations which may or may not be “treatable” to varying degrees allowing
them to come closer to some certain, abstract level of “normalcy.” While this
model has been largely rejected by people with disabilities, there is value in this
model in that it takes care and treatments seriously. People with disabilities,
being understood through this model, are often offered a variety of ways to
overcome their impairments. The varying forms of treatment that exist because
of this way of thinking can often drastically decrease the physical or cognitive
limits of a person’s disability. Such assistance might not exist if one were to focus
primarily on other understandings of disability instead. Examples of such limits
being reduced might include a person with MS being able to use a wheelchair for
easier mobility in a highly mobile society or a person who is hard of hearing
using hearing aids for the sake of being able to interact with individuals who
may not know sign language. Nevertheless, this approach is often considered to
be highly unhospitable to people with disabilities as it often assumes that the
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way an individual body is in the world should be changed to conform to a more
medically normal standard. One who is deaf may feel pressure from the nondeaf community to receive a cochlear implant or other form of hearing aid when
in fact they have no desire to hear because they are already a welcome member
of, and effective communicator in, the deaf community.

Social or Minority Group Model
Since the advent of the ADA, the more popular model for understanding
disability has been the Social or Minority Group Model. Nielsen points to
rhetoric used shortly after World War II by disability activists to state that society
was what was causing disability for those who were mentally or physically
impaired.15 The conceptual origins of the Minority Model itself come from the
Independent Living Movement in Berkley in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.16
Disability scholars Elizabeth DePoy and Stephen French Gilson state that the
notion of “disability” being largely social was first put into legislation in the
United Kingdom in the 1970’s.17 By the 1990’s, much of the political action that
had led up to the passing of the Americans with Disabilities Act had shed light

15

Nielsen, Disability History, 152, 155.

16

Creamer, Disability and Theology, 26.

17

Depoy and Gilson, Studying Disability, 35.
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on the fact that many people with disabilities felt that, though their disabilities
often varied greatly, they generally considered themselves to have a common
social experience of disability,18 what we might consider something of a common
identity.
This is the basic essence of the Social or Minority Group Model of
Disability: those with nonconventional bodies often find themselves impeded by
societies views of and/or lack of accommodations for their physical or cognitive
impairments. While there may still very well be variations in the social
experience of people with disabilities based on such factors as the visibility of
their disability, whether their disability is congenital, when the onset of their
disability occurred and a host of other factors, a “common set of stigmatizing
values and arrangements”19 has caused many people with disabilities to argue
that they constitute a minority group. Rather than setting people with disabilities
apart for their variations from the medical “norm,” they are set apart, in this
model, by how society responds to them. This allows for a rallying point that
does not coalesce around a sense of being aberrant, but a sense of comradery in
identity and understanding one another’s experiences.

18

Nielsen, Disability History, 180.

19

Eiesland, Disabled God, 24.
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My own sense of comradery with people with disabilities did not develop,
unsurprisingly, until I began to think of myself as a person with a disability.
Whether it was pride or simple ignorance, I had no sense of identification or
comradery with other people with disabilities. This changed drastically when
one of my undergraduate theology professors, and fellow individual with a
disability, stated to me that, “the world was not made with people like us in
mind.” While his disability and my own are rather different, this statement
instilled in me a sense of familiarity between our experiences, a certain shared
identity. It also put words to something that I had known to be true for years, but
had never realized that I needed to hear affirmed by someone else.
This moment caused a low-grade paradigm shift for me as “disability”
ceased to be about what “people like that” cannot do, but how “people like us”
have often experienced exclusion or stigmatization by virtue of our impairments.
I think this model can be a productive starting point for transforming our
conceptualization of people with disability. Perhaps a neurotypical person with a
conventional body might be able to ask themselves, upon meeting a person with
a disability, “how can this person be included?” instead of “what’s wrong with
them?” Or maybe the question could change to, “how has this person been
received and how should I receive them?” and not “I wonder what their disorder
is called?” Can we change our questions, internal or external, from centering
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around ability to centering around identity? This happens in our other every day
conversations as we lead with questions about employment, family, hobbies, etc.
all of which can be major identity pieces. Why not work in these same terms as
we approach people with disabilities? Finally, there is a level to which this
transformation needs to happen for people with disabilities as well, as I know
that some of us distance ourselves from other people with disabilities because we
may call ourselves “disabled,” but we do not want to think of ourselves as that
disabled, whether the distinction be qualitative or quantitative in our minds.

Problems with Existing Models
While the Minority Group model is seen by many as a large improvement
over the Medical Model, both still have their flaws. One major flaw that resides
in the Medical Model, and possibly in the Minority Group Model, is that this
model creates categories of normal and disabled which can often become
conflated with notions of what “should be.” DePoy and Gilson point out that this
notion of what “should” be, which is quite societally ingrained, is one we should
be suspicious of because “it prescribes what should be from observation of what
is most typical… reifying frequent as most desirable.”20 Our models of disability
should instead be cognizant of context. Disability is fundamentally larger than an
20

Emphasis original. Depoy and Gilson, Studying Disability, 69.
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individual and their variations from the norm or from what “should” be. DePoy
and Gilson state: “The judgment regarding typical and atypical appearance of
bodies, body parts, and mannerisms and adornments is… context-bound.”21
Being deaf or hard of hearing (HOH) will always be normal in schools for the
deaf and HOH. In that context, it would be hard to have the sense that the
student should be able to hear. Having Brachydactyly will always be normal
when I gather with my father, my sister Tara, my uncle Dave, and my cousin
Rachelle (and other relatives) for holidays; it is simply an unsurprising fact when
you gather enough Barneses together.
In Deborah Beth Creamer’s Disability and Christian Theology, she points out
some of the flaws that she sees in the existing models of disability theory. The
Medical Model, she states, “emphasizes body parts, ignoring the identity of the
whole person.”22 She suggests that we often fail to see beyond the atypical body a
person may posses and miss the social struggles (a major identity piece for many
people with disabilities) of these same individuals. This failure to see beyond the
person’s atypical body often puts outsiders and nondisabled people in the
position to be the determiners of who is “disabled,” in turn leading to
stigmatization and devaluation rather than the opportunity to select one’s own

21

Ibid, 52.

22

Creamer, Disability and Theology, 28.
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identity. Likewise, “healing” or perhaps more commonly, though less
appropriately, “fixing” is often the driver of this perspective, reinforcing the idea
that the person is not acceptable, or is at least less acceptable, as is.
On the other hand, the Minority Group Model, Creamer states, stresses
too much the disabled identity of people with disabilities to the neglect of other,
often highly significant identity pieces a person possesses such as sexuality or
ethnicity and can ignore the negative experiences of people with disabilities. The
very particular challenges that people with varying disabilities may face are
often disregarded by the Minority Group Model in pursuit of social solidarity
between people with disabilities. I would add that these same challenges are
often disregarded or emphasized by the broader public and as such the fellow
individual with a disability plays into many of the same issues presented by
“temporarily-abled”23 people. Where the Medical Model promotes an over
emphasis on change and “fixing,” the Minority Model has the capacity to
emphasize acceptance to the point of frowning upon the notion that any sort of
healing is needed.

A Third Model

23 This is a term used across the literature which is intended to serve as a reminder that, if a
person lives long enough, that person will become disabled simply by virtue of aging and become
“less able.” As well, I thoroughly appreciate the term for its capacity to disrupt the disability/ability
binary.
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As a third way of thinking about disability to be considered in tandem
with these two, Creamer proposes a “limits model” of disability which
understands disability as the full collection of limits that a person possesses,
many of which will be common to all people.24 For example, without the aid of
external devices, no person can fly, no person can breathe underwater, no person
can withstand the pressure at the bottom of the ocean for an extended period,
etc. Given that such limits are applicable to all people, she calls these limits,
“unsurprising.”25 Each person has experienced limits and as such no person
should be surprised by them. It is a common experience for all of humanity to
come up against some of life’s obstacles and say “my body, or mind, has too
many limits to overcome this obstacle.” Where a temporarily-abled person might
come up against a mountain or a wall and say “I cannot,” a person in a
wheelchair might come up against a flight of stairs, or perhaps worse, a single
step, and say, “I cannot.” The obstacles vary and the limits vary, but the
experience of limits is common and indeed universal for all humanity.
While people with disabilities may experience more limits than other
people, Creamer also points to an important question: what do limits produce?26

24

Ibid, 93.

25

Ibid.

26

Ibid, 94.
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She points to the example of a person in a wheelchair. Rather than looking at the
person and considering what the person is “not,” as one would be prone to do
operating under the medical model, we may ask how this person’s limits
compare to one’s own and may find that this person is not so different from
one’s self. Creamer’s emphasis on what a given person’s limits “may enable or
make difficult”27 allows each person to ask what one’s limits allow him or her to
do that is out of the ordinary (if anything28) and what things the person’s limits
make difficult. This assumption of similarity, that both people have limits, is
essential and liberatory as it can have the capacity to bring the nondisabled
individual into a position that involves some level of kinship with the person in
the wheelchair, beginning the work of freeing that person from their social
minority status.
The fundamental nature of my disorder is such that my limitations are
rather unique. Some of these limitations have workarounds and others do not.
My limitations are even different from my other family members who also have
Brachydactyly. In other people’s attempts to understand my experience, I have
often been assigned limits I do not actually possess, have been assumed to be

27

Ibid, 31.

28 It is essential to emphasize that often temporarily-abled people will try to start here, with
what a disability makes possible, to try and down play their own discomfort through suggesting
there are trade offs. It is hard to imagine a scenario in which this is productive, thus the importance
of allowing people with atypical bodies to determine what, if anything, is enabled.
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capable of things I am not actually capable of, or, worst of all, have been
assumed to somehow possess benefits from my unconventionally shaped hands.
Some even assume that such “benefits” “balance out” my limitations or
somehow are the reason for my aptitude at some manual skills such as
drumming or playing piano.
The disabled body, and I should also state, my disabled body, is often
“read” or experienced by the culture with a strong sense of discomfort and/or
uncertainty. With questions in mind such as, “Can that person lead a normal life?
Is this person perpetually suffering because of the disability they possess? Does
this person desire a different life, body, or brain?” the person is easily lost to the
limits perceived. While I happen to be someone who will often readily volunteer
information about my disability and make jokes about it casually, it is interesting
to me the varying points in my relationships at which people have felt it will be
ok to ask me about my disability. Will it be hours, weeks, years, or maybe even
mere seconds? Each of these has occurred. At what point has this person
determined that I will not be angry at or hurt by their curiosity? Has this person
considered that at all? At what point has this person determined they have the
right to know, or at least, ask about my hands? When is the appropriate time to
ask “So what’s the deal with…”? Likewise, when is right for me to ask a fellow
disabled person about their body? Am I allowed to know more because of our

The Communication of Limits

20

shared identity? Am I in some way safer to share information with than a
nondisabled person? Will I understand my fellow disabled person in ways that a
nondisabled person never could? Just because society may or may not lump us
together as disabled, does that make us social kin somehow? I believe all these
questions are deserving of deliberation.
At the risk of running into some problematic universalizing, I would like
to propose as well that limits can affect the yet unmentioned spiritual dimension
of our lives. While it may not be fair to say that an envious person has a
disability, certainly this envy creates certain limits for that person as they
experience their struggle with envy. What challenges might the envious person
face in having compassion for someone whom this person believes has a happier
life? Or for a person whom the envious one perceives to be more intelligent,
attractive, or wealthy? Likewise, what limits are created for an individual with a
bent towards lust or slothfulness or telling lies? While one might well suggest,
and I would agree, that there may be psychological limits associated with any
such proclivity, I think it is important not to disregard the spiritual dimension of
such a limit. This is a dimension western theologians are apt to neglect. Yet
western theologians have also been quick to neglect the importance of the body
by subtle appeals to Platonic dualisms. We are more than just our minds, we are
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more than just our bodies; we are mind, body, and spirit and any or all of these
three aspects of our lives may have limits.

Universality, Individuality and Autonomy
A major pitfall to avoid in this conversation about limits and their
universality is an overemphasis on the limits, or disability, of all people. It is true
that all people do indeed possess limits. As well, the disabled are quick to call
those without disabilities “the nondisabled,” a subversive act against the binary
into which we, the disabled, are so readily placed and because of which some of
us may be dismissed. This same binary, if we embrace the limits model to some
extent, really should be transformed into a spectrum, or perhaps some sort of
multidimensional chart with physical, emotional, cognitive and spiritual limits
on each axis, without any value placed on where one lands on the chart. Yet it is
important to emphasize the differences in points of view and life style between
people with disabilities and the so called “temporarily abled,” and the
understandings involved therein. This is the same sort of issue that arises when
people try to state “All Lives Matter” in response to the Black Lives Matter
movement: it misses the social and contextual particularity of the group of
people who are suffering. People with disabilities, or perhaps, people with more
severe limits, here and now, are dealing with a variety of social and
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environmental pressures that our nondisabled counterparts are not. It would be
wrong for my close, childhood friend with dyslexia to assume that he
understands the full extent of my day to day obstacles just because he has a hard
time reading. By that same token, it would be wrong for me to presume to
understand what he might deal with at work or in his social life because he is a
much slower reader than I.
As the only person in the world who understands my limitations and
capabilities as well as I do, I find myself sensing a deep need to be able to define
my own limits and abilities. As a person who is, in many ways, unlike other
people with Brachydactyly, and even unlike the family members I was raised
with who have similarly nonconventional bodies, the sense of individuality that I
experience is shared with many people who have many types of bodies that have
many types of limits. Friends, family members, scientists, and other outsiders
may attempt to understand the unique bodies and minds of people with
disabilities at varying times through varying means. However, these same
people can only come so far, even after a lifetime spent with a person who has a
disability. Yet with Bonhoeffer, I may say of Christ: “The [person] whom I am,
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Jesus has also been. Of him only is it valid to say that nothing human was alien
to him.”29
Here it is essential to state the importance of allowing the individual to
determine what is enabled and what is rendered difficult or impossible, rather
than any other disabled or nondisabled person. While a disability such as my
own enables me to be more aware of the physical, literal shape of the world
around me, the thickness and texture of the things I grab, and the ease, or lack
thereof, with which someone like myself may grip said items, I have not felt
physically enabled to do anything out of the ordinary. Yet other’s have
attempted to state for me: “He is a gifted musician because of his small hands.”
As though somehow the reduced grip that results from my short fingers has the
secret, hidden advantage of allowing me to drum more rhythmically, strike a
piano chord with more grace, or strum a mandolin with more precision while
reaching some hidden chord structures. I can assure you none of the above are
true. While I have learned to rapidly adapt to situations and objects that were not
designed with hands like mine in mind, I have not yet found any “advantages”
that I can derive from my disability. The issue lies in the assumption. Others read
my body as skilled and disabled, they then assume there must be a secret trick
stemming from my variation. These assumptions, while often and primarily
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christ the Center, trans. Edwin H Roberston. (San Francisco: Harper
Collins, 1960), 103.
29
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seeming to come from well meaning people, are still laced with a subtext that
suggests it is not dedication to my craft but a hidden advantage that has enabled
my skill. As though this disability, which I have yelled at God for, which has
kept me from doing many things, which has led to embarrassment any time I
drop anything, somehow has a secret other side that “balances it all out” and that
negates any ill will I may feel toward God for “knitting me together” in this way.
This narrative is all too common and I am no anomaly for having this story to
accompany my disability.

God’s Limits as Seen in Christ
If we put some stock in Creamer’s Limits Model, and in orthodox
Christology, then when we turn to Christ, we should not be surprised that God
incarnate, the fully human Christ, would also have experienced physical,
emotional, cognitive and even spiritual limits in his earthly life. One sees Christ
experiencing what Creamer might call the “unsurprising limits” of hunger
(Matthew 4:2), thirst (John 19:28), tiredness (Mark 4:38), and other limits of
corporeality throughout the four gospels. By nature of being fully God and fully
human, we must say also the Christ both did and did not possess omnipotence
and omniscience, so then what cognitive or emotional limits might he have
possessed? This turn of events, the omnipotent assuming limits, an attribute
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equally important as any other essential human attribute, would prove to be the
source of our salvation. Limits, in this situation, enabled the salvation of human
kind. It cannot be understated that Christ would not have been truly human
without the assumption of these same limits. Since the New Testament exhorts
us to be Christlike and because limits acted for our salvation in God through
Christ, it is worth our while to ask what it might mean to take on what we could
call a “Christlike limitedness.” This, discussion will be continued later, for now
we will dwell further upon the nature of the incarnation and what it means that
God took on all the limits one might expect to find in humanity.

Communicatio Idiomatum
This notion of Christ assuming human attributes, what is called in Latin
the Communicatio Idiomatum, meaning the communication (or “assumption”) of
idioms or attributes for our salvation is well summarized by this statement from
4th century theologian Gregory of Nazienzus: “That which he has not assumed he
has not healed; but that which is united to His Godhead is also saved.”30 Gregory
here is attempting to refute Apollinarianism, a theological view which heretically
stated that Christ had a human body but a divine mind thus suggesting that God
did not actually experience the fullness of humanity. Gregory, by contrast, insists
30

(CCEL).

Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistle 101 to Cledonius the Priest against Apollinarius, par. 5
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that for our redemption to be total, Christ must have taken on a body, a mind,
and all that it means to be human, including the limits contained therein. If
Christ had not taken on this fullness, Gregory states that it would be as if: “a
man's eye had been injured and his foot had been injured in consequence, [and]
you were to attend to the foot and leave the eye uncared for.”31 Quite in contrast,
Gregory would say that everything that was “communicated” to Christ, all the
“idioms” or attributes that are essential to humanity, has been saved and
transformed by the divine taking them on. As Dietrich Bonhoeffer puts it: “Of
[Christ] only is it valid to say that nothing human was alien to him.”32 This is the
essence of the communicatio idiomatum. This incarnational model was further
developed and expanded upon by Saint Athanasius.

Athanasius and the Incarnation
In its simplest form, orthodox Christology states that Jesus Christ was
both fully God and fully human. The communicatio idiomatum, especially Saint
Athanasius’ rendering of it, extends this notion to say that the fullness of God
and fullness of humanity were pressed inextricably close together by their
coexistence in one person. Athanasius was a fourth century Saint and defender of
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Bonhoeffer, Christ the Center, 103.
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Nicene theology who explained the communicatio idiomatum as such: “… the
Savior rightly put on a body, in order that the body, being interwoven with life,
might no longer remain as mortal in death, but, as having put on immortality,
henceforth it might, when arising, remain immortal”33 As such, what it means to
be human is forever changed because divinity and humanity have been
comingled; that which has been assumed, the fullness of humanity, everything
that it means to be fully human, has been saved.
Athanasius made most of his arguments in defense of Nicene theology,
the goal of which was primarily to determine the nature of the incarnation and to
refute Nestorianism which suggested that the two natures of Christ were not
fully united. Athanasius thoroughly emphasizes the fullness of God being
present in, yet untainted by, the human body of Jesus of Nazareth and the power
of Christ the incorruptible taking on a human body. This emphasis shows the
value he places on the very notion of the incarnation and the importance to him
of the fully human nature of Christ: Christ lacked nothing that it meant to be
human. Athanasius and the rest of the Nicene theologians’ goal was realized in
what became the orthodox affirmation of Nicaea that Christ was fully human
and fully divine, one being of two natures.

Saint Athanasius, On the Incarnation, trans. John Behr (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary
Press, 2011), 97.
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One of the major points of Athanasius’ Christology that is germane to
disability and theology is the corruptible/incorruptible paradox contained in the
fact that Christ, who was incorruptible by nature of being God, took on a body
which was corruptible, by nature of being human. Athanasius states in his
“Refutation of the Gentiles” that “while using the body as an instrument, [Christ]
partook of none of the body’s properties, but rather himself sanctified even the
body.”34 It is important for us to note here that “properties,” in Athanasius’
language, are elements which are common but not intrinsic to a human being.
These are things like femininity, African heritage, or balding. One is likely to see
people with any or all of these “properties” on any given day, but no one would
say that a person is not human simply because they lack one or all of them. As
such, we may say that Christ was fully human while still saying that he did not
take on all the “properties” of humanity, such as sinfulness.35
Within this Christological framework, a subtle but key point to
Athanasius’ view of the body, Christ, and the work Christ rendered unto the
human body, is that Christ was raised from the dead still incorruptible, but
possessing scars and unhealed wounds. As Athanasius puts it: “the Lord erected
the trophy over death and preserved incorruptible the body which he took,
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Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 96.
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raising it from the dead…”36 In response to this, one might ask how Athanasius
can rightly call a scarred, hole-ridden body “holy” and “incorruptible.” In the
simplest sense, and rather by contrast to some of the Old Testament’s teachings,
one can see in the resurrected Christ that wounds and scars no longer corrupt a
body. Rather, one may rise from the grave, to eternal life, still bearing the marks
of the earthly life that preceded the eternal life. In Athanasius’ view these marks
on the body do not equate to corruption of the body. Christ’s work of
interweaving life itself into the formerly, merely mortal body is not undone by
limits and scars but rather may include them.
Additionally, just as all things were made through Christ at the outset of
creation, Athanasius affirms that humanity is re-created through Christ, which
would be the only fitting way to re-create God’s creation since Christ was the
vehicle of the initial creative act.37 For a time, before the re-creation wrought by
Christ, salvation was a matter of the aforementioned “properties.” One needed to
be born Jewish or become Jewish, or if one lived before the Jews, then one
needed sacrifices for one’s atonement. In the re-creation, these properties became
moot relative to salvation which has been worked into the very nature of our
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humanity. God has now woven eternal life into the existence of the “rational”38
creatures. However, “rationality” in Athanasius’ work is used rather differently
than in contemporary English.
In Athanasius’ writings, the term “rational” is the word logikos (logikos).
Athanasius is using a play on words from the root logos (logos), or “word,” or in
this case, divine “Word.”39 Rationality, for Athanasius, is not a function of the
mind but of the soul and has to do with the welcoming of the presence of the
Word rather than with one’s capacity for logical thought, what most of us today
would call “rationality.” This is important to emphasize as it demonstrates for
the reader that Athanasius does not make any assumptions about the capacity of
one’s mind relative to one’s capacity to experience salvation. The Word has been
just as thoroughly woven into the bodies and minds of the already disabled as to
the bodies of the not-yet-disabled. The troubled or limited mind is still logikos,
rational, capable of perceiving and receiving the logos, the Savior.

Bonhoeffer’s Christology of Who
20th century, Lutheran theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer also put significant
stock in the notion of the communicatio idiomatum. In his work Christ the Center, a
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book posthumously compiled from his lectures on Christology, he states that the
communicatio idiomatum represents the “mutual participation and exchange of the
individual properties40 of the natures.”41 He goes on to state as well that because
of this “mutual participation and exchange,” we can now say of the human
Christ anything that we would say of God. As such, Bonhoeffer suggests that
even God’s more profound attributes, like omnipresence, have now been
conveyed to the human Christ. As Bonhoeffer quotes from the Formula of
Concord, “here is the highest communion which God truly has with man
assumed…”42 Bonhoeffer also emphasizes two further ideas about what the
communicatio idiomatum makes possible, which can be summed up as: we can say
nothing of Jesus’ humanity that we would not also say of his deity and
everything God accomplished in Christ was through the human flesh of Jesus of
Nazareth.
Because of the very dramatic change that has occurred in humans via the
incarnation, Bonhoeffer states that, “God’s Word carries the destroying lightning
and the life-giving rain. As Word, it destroys and creates the truth.”43 The old
truth of Leviticus that one who was bleeding or was blemished could not come
40
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near the Lord’s offering44 has been destroyed as the new truth was revealed by
the holy of holies, the divine presence being one of the natures which dwelt in
Christ as he bled out and was blemished on the cross. Bleeding was assumed and
healed. Blemishes were assumed and healed. The question becomes what does it
mean that the suffering of humankind has been assumed, and as such, has been
healed on the cross and through the incarnation? We will return to this question.
A final piece of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Christology that is germane to our
discussion is the idea that we must ask “Who” rather than “How” as we
approach the Christ. As he puts it: “’Who?’, is simply the religious question. It is
the question about the other person and [that person’s]45 claim… Questions of
transcendence and of existence become questions concerning the person.”46
Bonhoeffer goes on to state that our entire approach to Christology should be to
learn about Christ from the Christ himself. As the Word and direct revelation of
God, we have no better way to approach God than through Christ. We must,
Bonhoeffer says, go to the “place where the Person [of Christ] reveals himself in
his own being… Only by the Word freely revealing himself is the Person of
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my writing here and have instead attempted to be as inclusive as possible with my writing. Though
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Christ available…”47 Since Christ’s body is no longer present to us, we are now
left to approach the Christ through his “humiliation” via the “Word,” the
“Sacrament” and the “Congregation.”48 However, this humiliation is only a
humiliation because of Christ’s glory relative to our own sinful flesh. Word,
Sacrament, and Congregation are only humiliating loci for Christ’s presence by
virtue of relativity, not in and of themselves.

Interweaving, Healing, and Suffering
In the understanding of the incarnation that comes with the communicatio
idiomatum, people with disabilities have a friend and sibling who understands
them perfectly. While we have no reason to think that Christ had Brachydactyly,
dyslexia, autism, or any other disability for that matter, we know that he
experienced all that it means to be human. As we will see, we can confidently
state, that Christ suffers with us even now. Christ experiences the embarrassment
I feel when I drop a glass because I cannot hold onto it, the shame I feel when I
cannot open a jar with a large lid, and the fear I feel when I consider what
opportunities my children might miss out on if they inherit this genetic defect
from me. Just as Christ suffered for us on the cross, he suffers with us now when
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we feel the deep sense of inadequacy that sometimes comes with “living,
moving, and having our being” in a limited or disabled body.
This interweaving of life eternal into the formerly mortal body is at the
crux of the earlier statement from Gregory of Nazienzus: “That which he has not
assumed, he has not healed.”49 What then has Christ healed? One can see that
Christ assumed hunger, thirst, emotional pain, love of his fellow humans, loss of
relationship, the trauma and abuse that preceded the cross, and finally his death
upon the cross itself. One could extend this list with a close reading of any of the
gospels but one might infer, as proponents of the communicatio idiomatum have,
that Christ has healed every essential human experience; he has redeemed every
part of the human nature that is common to all of humanity. As mentioned
before, this does not necessarily include what Athanasius called the properties.
One of the things that has been assumed into the Godhead, through the
person of Christ, is human suffering. One can also say, if abiding in this line of
thinking, that Christ healed suffering, and if one counts death among the forms
of suffering, then the experience of suffering must be counted as essential to the
human condition; is it is a fate experienced by all. Christ experienced severe
physical suffering on Good Friday, underwent some level of emotional suffering
when he wept for Lazarus in John chapter 11 and when he was betrayed by
49
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Judas, and almost certainly experienced other forms of human suffering as well.
One even sees Jesus continuing to bear the marks of his suffering after he is
resurrected in the form of scars on his hands, feet, and sides. If one reads Isaiah
53 in a Messianic fashion, one can state that Christ was indeed “a man of
suffering and acquainted with infirmity” (Isa 53:3 NRSV) and that this aspect of
Christ’s humanity, no less than any other, followed him beyond the resurrection.
What then should one make of this bold notion that Christ has “healed”
suffering? If the Word, by whom life was created, has been intertwined with
suffering, perhaps we may say that one can still find “life” in the depths of their
deepest pain. Or maybe this pain may now be found to be meaningful rather
than merely being a senseless aspect of our mortal condition.50 How, too, is our
suffering different now than it was before the arrival of Christ? Athanasius
suggests “one who heals and teaches does not simply sojourn, but is of service to
those in need, and appears as those who need him can bear, lest by exceeding the
need of those who suffer he trouble [them].”51 Athanasius insists that the healing
and teaching work of Christ in the world was for the benefit of humankind; he
suffered for our sake. That humanity might see suffering that redeems, that
humanity might understand what it truly means to turn the other cheek, that
50 I have some considerable hesitations with this statement as the pat answer to suffering is
so often “well, God must have a plan.” I do not hope to promote such cheap language and theology
here.
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humanity might see God’s own self (i.e. Christ) be forsaken by God without
turning his back on God and learn what it means to endure God’s silence. With
the very source of life interwoven into our suffering, perhaps we might learn
how to suffer rightly. And perhaps those who suffer less, or perhaps even
impose suffering, wittingly or unwittingly, might see what it means to be an
effective co-sufferer, as Christ was unto all of humanity as well as unto his
contemporary followers.
While I have relatively little suffering to speak about here as a white man
from an upper-middle class family in a first world nation, I do feel the need to
try to address this question of how suffering can possibly have been healed in
Christ, at very least in relation to my own suffering. My only answer to this
question comes from the knowledge that God suffered as a human. God taking
on full humanity, when under no obligation to do so, can be thought of as the
greatest empathetic act of all time. I know that God has experienced frustration
at the human body and embarrassment at its shortcomings. While the omniscient
God surely “knew” what these things were like before the advent of Christ, God
“knows” now in a categorically different, deeper, experiential way. In the sort of
way that creates mutual understanding and a desire for shared identity amongst
people with disabilities. In the sort of way that allows God to say, “I understand”
like my own father, from whom I inherited my physical condition, has said “I
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understand” in those few moments when we have discussed our physical
limitations together.
With this understanding of the incarnation and the remarkable
conclusions we can draw from it, we may say, with Athanasius, that Christ truly
and experientially knows all that it means to suffer humanly. When we suffer,
we are not alone in either our pain or in what our pain might mean. Now, we can
turn to the idea of the co-suffering Christ, and the co-suffering community that
his body, the Church, one of the humiliating media we have for accessing Christ,
is called to be. While his body, the church, certainly fails often in this mission of
co-suffering, we may also ask how we may grow in our practices of co-suffering
in a truly Christlike manner.
As we consider the profundity of this ultimate empathic act, perhaps the
Church can ask itself how it might model a truly Christlike empathy. Perhaps for
a person with more severe needs, a day spent helping a person with a disability
as they need it could lead a nondisabled person into understanding and cosuffering in a Christlike way. Or for someone more willing and able to discuss
their struggles, a time spent in “holy listening,” a way of listening that does not
question but simply accepts a person’s story, could open their eyes to the lived
reality of a person with a disability. Likewise, many disability theologians have
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offered up their own models and ideas for how this kind of empathic cosuffering can occur.

Frameworks and Practices for Co-suffering

The Communion of Struggle
One framework for considering our practices of how we may co-suffer
with people with disabilities comes from Nancy Eiesland. In her pioneering book
The Disabled God, Nancy Eiesland suggests that just as people with disabilities or
nonconventional bodies may find that they have a body in which they struggle,
or a “body of struggle,” the Church may view itself as a “communion of
struggle.”52 We, the church, are often a broken and dysfunctional body trying to
make our way in a world that may or may not have been made, as my professor
said, “With people like us in mind.” If one wants to use Saint Paul’s analogy of
the church as a body in tandem with Eiesland’s, we might say that the eyes of
our body are often short-sighted, the hands are often too tightly clenched, and
the muscles are rarely able to work together, leading to all manner of struggles
just to coordinate our ecumenical and ecclesial efforts. We, the church catholic,
are a limited body, a communion of struggle.
52
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Yet, as Eiesland says, we are also a “communion of conversion,”53 a
communion that is meant to grow spiritually and emotionally, to learn from one
another through our differences, and to experience the renewal that comes from
the presence of the most high in our midst via the Holy Spirit, the person of
Christ, and the humiliating media. This second aspect we may say with even
more conviction as we consider that God is not only present in the invisible,
omnipotent sense, but he is present now as a resurrected human. Jesus of
Nazareth, who has walked the earth in a body like ours and who understands
humanity from within, via direct experience is present with us. Likewise, Jesus
lived in the communion of struggle with his disciples as they followed him and
attempted to learn what Christ’s church on earth would look like. Our
communion of struggle ought to be a communion undergoing conversion
towards empathic co-suffering.
Another important aspect of Eiesland’s idea of the “communion of
struggle” is her insistence that the biblical image of the resurrection is in no way
about the negation of the experience of disability or limits in exchange for a
perfect body. Christ rises from the grave scarred, with a hole still in his side.
Rather, nonconforming bodies can, and do, participate in the imago Dei. Despite
the imperfections of our individual bodies, we are a part of the corporate, and
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corporeal, body of Christ in our churches. Thus, any efforts to remove or limit
the participation of people with disabilities in our churches is tantamount to
shooting ourselves in the foot. As Christians, we need to be aware of our own
attempts to hide or negate people with disabilities among us. They too are part of
the body and reflect the Imago Dei.

Suffering, Co-Suffering, and Remembering
John Swinton, one of the most prolific disability theologians currently
writing, points out that, just as most Christians believe that Christ suffers with
the broad sweep of humanity during the course of our lives because of his
closeness to us, we may also assert that he suffers quite specifically with the
disabled; we are not left out of the equation. As well, Christ is not merely
empathetic, he is a co-sufferer.54 Swinton goes on to drive home the point that if
the church wishes to do this very Christ-ian work of co-suffering with the people
with disabilities our best vehicle for doing so is through friendship.55 This cannot
be merely “missionary” friendship, however, there must be genuine valuing of
the other person and desiring to build friendship with the person, even if it
seems there are some initial hurdles to friendship.
54 John Swinton, Resurrecting the Person: Friendship and the Care of People with Mental
Health Problems (Nashville: Abingdon Press 2000), 201.
55

Ibid, 51.

The Communication of Limits

41

An important starting point for building these friendships is to work
towards overcoming attitudes that treat people with disabilities as being
somehow “other.” Some people with cognitive or emotional disabilities suffer or
endure symptoms that make social connection very difficult. Swinton specifically
focuses on schizophrenia as an example. He states: “…particular symptoms and
experiences that the [schizophrenic] person encounters makes normal
communication and relational interaction extremely difficult… Consequently the
other person is experienced as somehow ‘other’ and lines of communication and
relationship collapse.”56 These failed connections lead to attitudes that often turn
people into an “other” and that is how we create “the schizophrenic.”57 While
some people will have limitations that make even basic conversation and relating
impossible, such as extreme dementia or Alzheimer’s, we may still connect with
these people as we acknowledge that they can still feel and relate in some
capacity. This remembrance is essential to retaining the personhood and
humanity of these same people.
Within the church this means making an intentional process of
“remembering” those whose humanity we so easily forget and turn into objects.
Swinton calls these dangerous memories, memories which remind us of our roles
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as oppressors, memories that make us uncomfortable and call us back into
critical solidarity with the oppressed.58 Swinton even goes so far as to say that
this sort of practice “forms the essence of the kingdom.”59 He goes on to say, “In
remembering someone, we acknowledge the person as worthy of memory, and
acceptable as a full person.”60
I cannot help but think here of a strong contrast to this concept of
remembering as seen in the life of the fictional character Charlie Gordon from the
book Flowers for Algernon. In Flowers for Algernon, the protagonist Charlie is a
severely mentally handicapped individual who undergoes scientific testing to
see if his condition can be changed to the point that he can become at all “cured”
from his condition. The operation is a “success,” and as his IQ grows and he
becomes increasingly intelligent, he begins to have memories of his life before
the operation. One such memory is from his childhood when he was taken to a
doctor to see if he could be “fixed.” Charlie’s parents were frustrated by the fact
that he was mentally disabled and found a doctor who claimed he could “cure”
Charlie. Although the doctor turned out to be a con-artist who charged Charlie’s
parents without actually offering any form of meaningful cure, Charlie liked the

58

Ibid, 126-127.

59

Ibid, 127.

60

Ibid.

The Communication of Limits

43

doctor. He liked the doctor because he was one of the only people who had ever
treated him like a person.61 Never mind the fact that Charlie’s parents said they
loved him and provided for him, they did not treat him like he was human and
so they failed him. I hope that we in the church are struck by the importance of
this simple act of remembering one another’s humanity.

The Virtue of Attentiveness
Very much in agreement with Swinton’s suggestion that the church
engage the practice of friendship with the disabled, Richard B. Steele suggests
that we develop four virtues for use in caring for people who cannot care for
themselves. He defines the term virtue here as “a praiseworthy character trait, a
kind of moral or spiritual strength, which a person must deliberately
cultivate…”62 While all four of his suggested virtues are of value in the practice
of ministry to and with people with disabilities, I want to focus here specifically
on what Steele calls the virtue of attentiveness. This virtue of attentiveness he
describes as: “the habitual practice of connecting with people… simply because
they are people… it is a rare virtue because it takes such self-restraint for one to
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show love to those who problems one may not be able to solve…”63 This is a love
based on allowing the other person to be what they are, to allow that person to
define their own limits, and to decide what help they want rather than forcing
them to accept whatever help may be given. We might even call this the virtue of
unimposing service, allowing people with disabilities to determine what limits
they want help with and which they would rather deal with on their own.
This way of attentive interacting deconstructs the problematic aspects of
the Medical Model while simultaneously reinforcing the fact that people with
disabilities have just as much right to self-definition as the non-disabled do. It
also forces the one who would desire to help to be sure that they actually are
helping, not just imposing their “service,” and that they are coming to know the
person they desire to help. Attentiveness as a virtue has the capacity to be
transformative because, when applied properly, it forces the one who would try
to help to change their actions from being generically “Christian service”
oriented to “Christlike friendship” oriented. This is a change that takes the
actions from being about what the non-disabled person is supposed to do, to
what builds relationship between the people, and what serves the person with a
disability as a person in need in the Church community.
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Speaking “I-Thou”

As a compliment to Steele’s concept of the virtue of attentiveness, I also
want to draw on Martin Buber’s concept, found in his seminal text “I and Thou,”
of the two primal words “I-Thou” and “I-It.” In Buber’s concept, one speaks “IIt” and treats a person64 as “It” when one presumes to know something about the
person that has not been received in authenticity. That is, whatever the person
presumes to know, is not something that they have received from the person, but
is rather something that they have conjured up about who they deem that person
to be, or what they deem them to be like. However, and this is the higher though
not always possible ideal, we may also speak “I-Thou” and so treat a person as
“Thou:”
The primary word I–Thou can be spoken only with the whole being.
Concentration and fusion into the whole being can never take place
through my agency, nor can it ever take place without me. I become
through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. All real living
is meeting.65
In essence, Buber is stating that two people have to meet one another with the
fullness of themselves while imposing no presupposed ideas onto the person

64 Buber also includes other living things such as trees and animals in his conception of who
or what a given “Thou” might be. For the purposes of this discussion, I have limited “Thou” to human
kind, hopefully without any misrepresentation of Buber’s work.
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whom they are attempting to connect with: one must present their attentive,
authentic self and receive the same from the other in order to speak “I-Thou.”
Both words are necessary and both are powerful for humankind. Early in
his text Buber summarizes the words by saying, “As experience, the world
belongs to the primary word I–It. The primary word I–Thou establishes the
world of relation.”66 Here Buber is stating that most of our time is spent
experiencing the world and the many “Its”, or things, that we encounter with our
senses and our interpersonal interactions. However, sometimes humanity can
also move beyond this into what Buber calls the “spirit”67 where we relate to
some “Thou” whom we treat with full, receptive, dignity:
“Spirit is not in the I, but between I and Thou… like the air in which you
breathe. [A person] lives in the spirit, if [they are] able to respond to [their]
Thou. [This person] is able to, if [they enter] into relation with [their]
whole being. Only in virtue of [their] power to enter into relation is [the
person] able to live in the spirit.”68,69
The connection between Buber’s concept of I-Thou and self-definition, and
its capacity for transforming our conception of people with disabilities is
probably quite clear. If we meet people with disabilities and impose our
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assumptions onto them, presume to know their struggles, presume to know
what they are capable of, then in any of those processes, and many others, we
speak the I-It word. When we allow the person to speak for oneself, present
ourselves as willing to listen, and proactively avoid imposing our ideas, we
speak the I-Thou word. This is the life-giving word that allows for full humanity
on the part of both the speaker and the receiver. As Buber states, it is not always
possible to speak the I-Thou Word because of the effort required on the part of
the speaker and the hearer to say it. However, when it comes to people with
disabilities and other disenfranchised groups, I would suggest that it is our duty
as Christians to go out of our way to extend the I-Thou word. Where our
churches, governments or institutions may disenfranchise, it is our task to help
rehumanize these people who have been made into caricatures and attempt to
aid in restoring them to their fully human status. Attentiveness will help with
this process. Likewise, recognizing that even if we do not self identify as
disabled, we too can identify as having our own limits. This may be the first step
towards speaking the I-Thou word. Just as Christ emptied himself to become
human, we also must empty ourselves to become human, at least in Buber’s
conception of humanity. Just as this act was profound and salvific coming from
Christ, this act coming from his bride the Church may act to build up and
encourage his body.
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Theology Via the Body
Returning to Nancy Eiesland, an important part of her work, which
Creamer also speaks to heavily, is the importance of understanding that all
people interact with the world and do theology through and with their bodies.
Where feminists and liberationists have emphasized the feminine, colored or
impoverished body, writers in the world of disability and theology emphasize
the “medically” unconventional body as it reads and is read by the world that
surrounds it. Theology is impossible without a body with which to do it and it is
modernity’s arrogance that leads us to believe we should, or even that we can,
disregard our physical context as we consider God. A recognition of the world
and its make up is impossible without a body. For people with disabilities, the
awareness of the embodiment of their theology is often very present already.
Eiesland states this most poignantly as such:
The corporeal is for people with disabilities the most real… we become
keenly aware that our physical selves determine our perceptions of the
social and physical world. These perceptions, like our bodies, are often
nonconforming and disclose new categories and models of thinking and
being.70
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Eiesland points out that those of us with disabled bodies are even more aware of
our embodiment because we are aware of the many ways in which the world
was made for people very unlike ourselves.
John Swinton takes this notion a step further as he states, “The full
revelation of love requires bodies and not just words.”71 The body in which we
move about has the capacity to be a vehicle for the love of God, or for nefarious
or neglectful forces. For the non-disabled, Swinton says, this remembrance is
essential as for many people, especially those with more severe mental limits, the
Christian community maybe the closest thing to a concept of God that they ever
encounter. One could, and I might, argue that the role of the Holy Spirit can be
diminished in this proclamation. However, assuming that the work of the Holy
Spirit somehow gets any Christians off the hook in representing the love of
Christ to people with disabilities, is to assume that Christians have no role to
play in shining the light of Christ in the world, which would be a most troubling
claim.
In talking about the struggle of writing her memoir about her life with
multiple sclerosis, Catholic author Nancy Mairs states: “… no matter what I’m
doing I can no longer forget that I have multiple sclerosis…”72 Mairs thoroughly
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opposes the Western idea of mind body dualism proposed by Western culture
and instead insists that all people, disabled or not, must come to terms with
“ourselves as bodies.”73 Likewise, I am keenly aware of the size and texture of the
everyday things I use with my hands and the ways in which these things are or
are not easily used by hands like mine. Similarly, the blind may be aware of a
lack of literature available in braille or audiobook formats at their local library.
The wheelchair bound may be more aware of the lack of ramps in public places,
and so it goes for many people with disabilities. The possibilities for what
disabilities cause us to be aware of are endless.
In the face of situations where limits pose significant challenges for people
with disabilities, adaptation or exclusion are often our only options and every
time that we weigh our options we feel the impact of what our bodies are like:
unconventional, and perhaps, the environment would suggest, unwelcome. In
some situations, the request for help may be a possibility, but only at the risk of
exposing our need in a way contrary to the cultural values of independence and
self-sufficiency so prevalent in contemporary Western culture. Some of my
friends have been surprised to hear that I think about the shape of my hands an
average of about a once a day. While I cannot presume to speak for other
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individuals with unconventional bodies or minds, I can imagine that there are
plenty who think about their variances with far greater regularity. Hourly for
some? Such physical variations may seem minute in comparison to being of a
different gender, ethnic group, sexual orientation or any other of myriad identity
pieces, but variations in physical ability are defining, and at times confining, both
in how one perceives and in how one is perceived. Yet it is important to state as
well, with Eiesland, that for many of us: “Embodying disability is not an
extraordinary feat; rather it too is a process of symbolically and corporeally
constructing wholeness and ordinary physicality.”74
For the nondisabled, theological consideration of one’s own body has the
capacity to be a transformative process. Asking one’s self how one’s body affects
the way they receive others and how they are received by others can be a starting
point for developing bodily awareness in ways that many people with
disabilities are already aware of. As well, considering the way people with
various disabilities interact with the world generally and the church specifically
can be a helpful exercise in transforming our conception of people with
disabilities. What is the experience of sacred music like for a deaf person? What
is the experience of the homily like for a person with severe autism? How are
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these experiences shaping their conception of who God is? Our bodies strongly
affect our experience of both worship and theology.

Reflecting on and Defining One’s Own Limits
Disabled memoirist Nancy Mairs reflects on her own uncertainty in how
to talk about her own disability and others’ in her book Waist-High in the World.
In her introduction, she says, “How can I believe that my life is real when it feels
so desperately provisional? Oddly I don’t consider the lives of other people with
disabilities to be similarly inauthentic. Only my own seems flimsy and
inauthentic.”75 She was thirty before the onset of her MS and has become
increasingly impaired ever since because of this degenerative disease. Yet she
describes, with a certain amount of tongue in cheek, being thankful for the
process because such loss allows one to “grow incrementally into each loss and
so more easily retain a modicum of composure throughout the process.”76
Mairs’ humor regarding her experience of disability is refreshing for me as
person with an atypical body. Likewise, it is a tool I, and other people with
disabilities I know, employ regularly to self-identify and to destigmatize or
contextualize our experiences. Mairs’ statement, “Here I am… hunched and
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twisted and powerless but for two twelve-volt batteries beneath my ass. Woe is
me!”77 feels akin to jokes I have made about coming up “short-handed,” about
having a hard time “gripping” a concept, or other such remarks. The way Mairs
uses humor allows her to put her disability to her own advantage. This is
obviously an opportunity not all disabled people have, but is a tactic put to good
use in her writing as she skillfully and often poignantly calls out the ridiculous
ideas society has about what it means to be “normal.”
Our society tries to keep people with disabilities from talking about our
disabilities, but humor can be a subversive tool that allows us to speak about the
aspects of our identity that so often make others uncomfortable. While it is rarely
my goal to make people uncomfortable as I talk about my hands, it is a topic I
rarely have the opportunity to discuss on my own terms. Often, I either express
my frustrations about my limitations making others feel they need to be sorry for
me, or someone asks me “What’s going on with your hands?” In response to this
question my options hardly extend beyond either appearing overly selfconscious as I inform the person that I do not feel like talking about it, or
indulging their curiosity regardless of whether or not I want to talk about my
hands with this person. Humor allows me to offer up information in ways that I
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can control and allows me to self define my limits and my identity in ways that I
am comfortable with.
Mairs defines her own limits, identity, and terms for herself in profound
ways throughout the course of her memoir. She often calls herself a cripple,
knowing that few other people in her situation would want to call themselves
that and never calling anyone else a cripple. She explains that she does so as a
way of being forthright about her own perception of her condition. This title
allows her to define her situation for herself, to explain her identity, and even to
have a chance to laugh at her own condition a bit as she says it.
In total, Mairs demonstrates something of an ideal for people with
disabilities, an ideal that is not always attainable. While I do not want to say that
she has an ideal situation or somehow has an “easy” disability, she does present
a few ways of living with a disabled body that the nondisabled would benefit
from understanding and helping people with disabilities in their own lives to
attain. Primarily she demonstrates the ability to define one’s own limits and
terms for their life. She uses humor and writing to do this, but for those people
with disabilities who are unable to do this, the church is called to advocate for
them and aid them in this self definition.

Conclusion
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To bring this all together, I want to draw on a critique from John Swinton,
originally directed towards Nancy Eiesland’s book The Disabled God:
If autonomy, liberation, civil rights, self-representation and equal access to
the political and ecclesiological systems are the goals of such [liberationist]
approaches, then how are we to understand and make sense of those
people whose impairments prevent them from ever being able to achieve
or participate in such goals.78
Here Swinton importantly emphasizes that as much as we may advocate for
autonomy and self-definition on behalf of people with disabilities, we must
remember that there are those who, by and large, cannot self advocate because of
their disability, or because of their membership in an overly stifling society. This
is where Swinton’s notion of co-suffering, Steele’s virtue of attentiveness,
Creamer’s conceptualization of limits, and Eiesland’s liberationism all meet: in
the place where the members of God’s church truly speak the I-Thou word to the
person before them, suffering with that person, allowing that person to define
their identity, and actively working on their behalf before political, ecclesial, and
other authorities to proactively safeguard and advocate for the fullness of their
humanity. I would even suggest that this is in keeping with the author of the
book of James notion of pure religion:

But those who look into the perfect law, the law of liberty, and
persevere, being not hearers who forget but doers who act—they will be
blessed in their doing… 27 Religion that is pure and undefiled before God,
25
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the Father, is this: to care for orphans and widows in their distress, and to
keep oneself unstained by the world. (James 1:25, 27)
Where those who cannot self-advocate are marginalized, (orphans and widows
in James context and some people with disabilities in our own) the rest of us
must advocate on their behalf.
However, before this advocacy can occur, it is important to know, and to
attempt to understand the people for whom one advocates. We must speak the IThou word unto these people to see their humanity and from there, we may act
in advocacy for them. As Athanasius states: “the achievements of the Savior…
are of such a kind and number that if anyone should wish to expound them he
would be like those who gaze at the expanse of the sea and wish to count its
waves.”79 The disabled God, the Christ, is truly worth our never-ending
contemplation, and the person with a disability admittedly is not, however a
further statement must be made here. Namely, that it is worth our while to
assume that we have not yet fully understood the stories of our brothers and
sisters with disabilities. While no person is likely to fit into the identity boxes we
have created for them, it is of particular importance that we break down the
identity boxes of righteous suffering, victim of genetics or incident, blessed or
cursed by God, etc. for the sake of understanding the individual, the child of God
who is before us. Otherwise, we risk turning these people into missionary
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“projects,” people we believe need healing, or people who are somehow
“incomplete” as they are.
As well, we should not consider any of this to be above or beyond the
profound call God has placed on the lives of God’s people. Loving one another,
and advocating for one another ought to be at the core of the identity of who
God’s people consider themselves to be. The Christ took on limits, fully and
deeply intertwined with humanity, and died so that we might see God incarnate
acting out the will of God on the earth and modeling for us how we ought to live.
The profundity of this act should not be lost on us. Rather by contrast, the
incarnation should inspire us to do the work of God in small everyday actions,
like acting with attentiveness and speaking the I-Thou word. Like allowing
people with disabilities to define their capacities, their limits, and their identities
in the ways that they want to.
Maximus the Confessor, a 7th century saint, proclaimed in his writings
what I consider one of the best possible practices for interacting with fellow
believers, regardless of how our beliefs, identities, or spiritual praxes may align.
Extrapolating on the words of Gregory of Nazienzus, Maximus states:
we are clothed in the body of humiliation, and likewise we are subject to
the manifold evils that arise from it because of its inherent weakness; and
rather than magnifying ourselves over others in view of the inequality all
around us, we should by prudent consideration even out the disparity of
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our nature, which in its own right is equal in honor, by filling other’s
deficiencies with our own abundances.80
Each of us has “deficiencies” and “abundances” as Maximus states, or perhaps
“limits” and “gifts” as Creamer might call them. It is our duty as believers and
disciples of Christ to use our abundances to aid others where they experience
limits. The practices of “filling in” one another’s deficiencies should always be
regulated by the one with more deficiencies, in as much as that is possible. For
some identity groups, this is more easily accomplished than for others. For those
who literally cannot speak, the challenges inherent in this effort are significant.
Yet this is not a practice that we can neglect if we wish to faithfully fulfill the
mission of Christ. Christ who, for love’s sake, in a twofold mystery, took on all
the limits that come with being human that he might fill out all of our
deficiencies. May Christ’s body the Church give from whatever abundances we
need to, and take on whatever limitations are necessary, that we might, in some
small way, do the same.
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